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1 Introduction
In 2002, the Swedish child-care fee system was reformed by the introduction of the
so-called maximum fee. For most parents of pre-school children the reform implied
substantially reduced child-care fees. This decreased the cost of market work and
made many families economically better off. In this paper, we analyze the effects of
this reform on labor supply of parents of young children and on equity and social
welfare. Using simulations, we compare the effects of the maximum fee reform to
those of a possible policy alternative: increased child benefits.1 The question we ask
is whether the maximum fee performs better in terms of social welfare compared to
increased child benefits.
Since the maximum fee has decreased marginal child-care fees, incentives for
market work have been strengthened. The effect of the reform on labor supply
has been studied by Lundin et al. (2007) who analyze observed pre- and post-reform
labor supply, and find rather modest effects. A difficulty in using actual observations
is, however, that the maximum fee was only part of a larger reform, which also
implied that children whose parents were unemployed or on parental leave became
eligible for subsidized care and that children of age 4 and 5 received 15 hours of care
a week for free. By using simulations we can isolate the effects of the maximum fee
from those of the other changes concerning child care.
There is a growing literature on the effects of the price of out-of-home child
care on especially female labor supply. Child-care subsidies have in many cases
been found to be a good way to promote female labor supply, both in terms of
labor force participation and hours worked. Powell (1997) finds that policies that
reduce child-care fees would significantly increase labor supply of married mothers in
Canada both by increasing labor force participation and hours worked. Averett et al.
(1997), who study married mothers in the US, also find that government subsidies to
reduce child-care fees would substantially increase hours worked. Studying married
mothers in the US, Ribar (1992) concludes that labor force participation is impeded
by high child care costs, but in another study Ribar (1995) finds that married
mothers’ labor supply is relatively insensitive to changes in child-care costs once they
are working. According to Kimmel (1998), who also studies US mothers, married
1Apps and Rees (2004) also compare subsidized child care and child benefits. They show that
a child-care subsidy financed by reduced child benefits increases both fertility and female labor
supply.
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mothers’ employment are more affected by child care prices than single mothers’.
However, Tekin (2005) finds that labor force participation of single mothers in the
US is highly responsive to child care subsidies. Also Michalopoulos and Robins
(2001) study single mothers, in Canada as well as in the US, and find significant
effects on employment of child-care subsidies.
In many European countries, child-care markets work differently than in the US;
they are often characterized by heavy subsidies, which also means that rationing may
be a problem due to excess demand. European studies have shown that increased
subsidies promote female labor supply, but to a rather weak extent, see e.g. Del
Boca (2002) for Italy, Gustafsson and Stafford (1992) for Sweden, and Wrohlich
(2006, 2007) for Germany. They all suggest that reduced rationing has a stronger
impact on labor supply than further reduced fees. An exception is a Norwegian
study by Kornstad and Thoresen (2006), showing that fee reductions would increase
labor supply of married mothers more than abolished queues.
In this paper, we study Swedish single mothers and couples and their response
to increased child-care subsidies. We study the effects on mothers’, as well as on
fathers’ labor supply. Swedish municipalities are nowadays obliged to provide sub-
sidized child care to all children aged 1–5, so there is (in principle) no rationing
in Sweden. The maximum fee reform was costly for the Swedish public sector,
and had to be covered by taxes. We do not judge whether the reform was a so-
cially beneficial reform or not, taking the financing part into account; we simply
ask whether the money spent on the reform could have been used more effectively
in order to improve the well-being of families with young children. In doing so, we
put the maximum fee against a budgetary equivalent, but hypothetical, reform of
increased child benefits. We assume the same group of households to be targeted
in the alternative reform: families with children aged 1–5. Hence, we analyze the
two alternative reforms and their effects on labor supply and equity. To be able
to predict labor supply responses to the two reforms we make simulations based
on parameters obtained from the estimations of two discrete choice random utility
models, one for single mothers and one for two-parent households. The estimations
are made using individual pre-reform data containing detailed information on wage
rates, incomes, family structure, and a number of background variables. These data
are further combined with a micro simulation model, including all rules for taxes,
transfers and fees in all Swedish municipalities.
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The welfare effects of the two reforms are calculated in terms of equivalent varia-
tion, and are based on simulated effects following from the two reforms. It turns out
that the unweighted sum of the welfare gains of all households is larger for the max-
imum fee reform than for the increased child benefit. On the other hand, the max-
imum fee also implies a higher Gini coefficient than the alternative reform. Taking
distributional effects into account, we adopt a welfare analysis using distributional
weights. We construct the distributional weights in the tradition of Christiansen and
Jansen (1978). Which reform to prefer depends on the social welfare function’s rela-
tive weight given to equality. Based on plausible values of social inequality aversion,
the maximum fee turns out to be inferior to increased child benefits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the Swedish
child-care fee reform and the child-benefit system. In Section 3 we specify the econo-
metric model and in Section 4 we describe the data. The simulation approach is
presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 presents the results for the struc-
tural model, as well as for the simulated effects on labor supply, disposable income,
and welfare from the two alternative reforms. Section 7 compares the results and
discusses the welfare effects. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Child-care fees and child benefits
In Sweden, child care is heavily subsidized. Before 2002, child-care fees were com-
pletely set by the municipalities. Fees then varied widely across municipalities, and
were in most cases based on parental income as well as on the number of hours per
week spent in child care. For example, 90 percent of the municipalities had income-
based fees and 98 percent had time-based fees in 1999. The average fee for a two
child family with average income was SEK 2,800 per month (EUR 311),2 but varied
as much as between zero and SEK 4,160 between the municipalities with the lowest
and the highest fees (Skolverket, 2003). Since fees were based on both income and
time spent in child care, longer working hours as well as a better paid job resulted in
increased fees. In most municipalities, a one percent increase in gross family income
was associated with an increased fee by 0.7-1.3 percent, with a median of 1 percent
(Skolverket, 1999).
The maximum fee reform, which took effect in 2002, aimed at improving the
2Throughout the paper we use the exchange rate SEK 9=1 EUR
3
economic situation for families with young children and increasing labor supply
among parents by introducing a new fee structure for publicly subsidized child care.
At the time of the reform, 80 percent of all children aged 1–5 were enrolled in public
child care, a share that increased to 83 percent in 2003. A large majority of families
with pre-school children have accordingly been affected by the reform. The new
maximum fee is still based on family income, but only up to a rather low ceiling
above which the fee is constant. For the first child the fee is 3 percent, for the second
child 2 percent, and for the third child 1 percent of gross family income. No fees are
charged for further children. The ceiling is set fairly low – in 2002, family incomes
exceeding SEK 38,000 (EUR 4,222) per month were excluded from the fee base. As
a result most families paid the monthly maximum amount SEK 1,140 (EUR 127),
760, and 380 for the first, second, and third child in child care (Skolverket, 2005).
Subsidized child care is provided by the municipalities and by law they have to
provide care for all children aged 1 –5.3 Children of working parents are offered care
during their parents’ working hours only.4 Parental fees contribute to a small part
of the total child-care costs: 16 percent in 1999 (before the reform), and 10 percent
in 2003 (after the reform). Remaining costs are covered by municipal subsidies
and by conditional grants from the central government. These grants are part of
the maximum fee reform. Since child care is a municipal matter, the fee reform
had to be accompanied by a grant scheme that made a general reduction of child-
care fees possible. The maximum fee is voluntary to the municipalities, but all
municipalities have nevertheless adhered to it. However, the general implementation
of the maximum fee reform does not imply that all municipalities have identical fee
structures; it only defines the upper limit of the fees. Variations in fee design still
exist, but have become considerably smaller and within the scope of the maximum
fee reform.
The maximum fee has undoubtedly improved the financial situation for most
families with pre-school children. The reason is twofold: First and foremost, child-
care fees have generally decreased, which is obvious from Table 1 where the effects
for four family types are presented. Nearly all families gained from the introduc-
tion of the maximum fee, but to different extents (Skolverket, 2003). High-income
3Private child care providers are also subsidized by municipalities if they meet certain require-
ments and are therefore also affected by the maximum fee reform.
4However, after the child-care reform, four and five year old’s are entitled to 15 hours a week
irrespective of their parents’ labor market status.
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households utilizing child care during long hours gain more from the reform than
low-income earners.
Second, the marginal fee – the fee increase of an additional hour of child care –
has drastically decreased for most families. Before the reform long hours as well as
high income resulted in high fees. After the reform, time in child care has no impact
on the fee in most municipalities and since many households reach the ceiling, they
pay no extra fee if they work more.
Table 1: Child-care fees 1999 and 2002 by family type
Number of children 1 2 2 2
Hours in child care (per week) 46 33 46 46
Household income 18,400 41,100 41,100 46,554
Median fee 1999 1,056 2,808 3,167 3,374
Median fee 2002 (maximum fee) 552 1,900 1,900 1,900
Difference 1999−2002 504 (48%) 908 (32%) 1,267 (40%) 1,774 (53%)
Sources: Skolverket (1999, 2003).
Fees and incomes are expressed in SEK per month in fixed 2002 prices.
2.1 Child benefit
The Swedish child benefit is a universal non-taxable benefit dating back to 1948,
then introduced to encourage childbirth. It is paid to all mothers with children aged
16 or younger, irrespective of the parents’ labor market status and income. During
1999, the amount was SEK 750 (EUR 83) per month and child, and there was a
supplementary child benefit from the third child on.5
In a redistributive perspective, child benefits are more successful than the Swedish
child-care subsidies. There are two reasons for this. First, also families with chil-
dren not using subsidized child care receive child benefits. This group of families is
dominated by families with low labor market activity and low family income. Sec-
ond, among families that utilize subsidized child care, the families with the lowest
incomes cannot gain very much from a reduction of already low child-care fees.
5The monthly supplementary child benefit was SEK 200 for the third child, SEK 600 for the
fourth child, and SEK 750 for following children.
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3 Economic model and empirical specification
The effects on labor supply and income distribution are obtained by simulating a
structural labor supply model, mimicking the actual choice process by identifying
the alternative with the highest utility.6 We follow the approach of van Soest (1995)
and discretize the choice set of working hours. In the discrete choice model agents
choose between a number of labor supply alternatives.7
We consider two kinds of families – single-mother households and two-parent
households. In the latter we assume that spouses maximize a joint utility function
and jointly determine their labor supply hm and hf (where subscripts indicate male
and female).8 Following van Soest (1995) we adopt the translog utility function,
which increases in disposable income, and decreases in hours of work.
U (Γ) = Γ′1AΓ1 + b
′Γ2, (1)
where Γ1 = {log y, log (T − hm) , log (T − hf )} is a vector of the logarithm of house-
hold disposable income (y) and the logarithms of the leisure of both spouses.
Γ2 = {log y, log (T − hm) , log (T − hf ) , σ} also includes the binary variable σ,
which takes the value of one if the household is a social assistance recipient, and
zero otherwise. By including σ we follow e.g. Hoynes (1996), Keane and Moffit
(1998) and Flood et al. (2004) and allow for possible non-participation among eligible
households. T is the total amount of time available to each individual (equal to 4,000
hours per year). A is a symmetric 3× 3 matrix with the elements αij, i, j = 1, 2, 3,
comprising the estimable coefficients to the quadratic and cross terms in the utility
function. (We do not include any quadratic or cross terms associated with receiving
social assistance.) b with the elements βi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, is the 1 × 4 vector of the
estimable coefficients to the linear terms in the utility function. In order to specify
the nature of heterogeneity in household preferences for leisure and for receiving
social assistance, we model three of the coefficients (associated with i = lm, lf , σ)as
functions of observed and unobserved characteristics:
6van Soest (1995), Aaberge et al. (1995), Aaberge et al. (1999), Flood et al. (2004), Kornstad
and Thoresen (2006), and Wrohlich (2007), are some previous labor supply applications.
7Flood and Islam (2005) show that a discrete choice model produces results similar to those
obtained from a continuous model.
8The procedure for single mothers is analogous, but with only one labor supply variable.
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βi =
∑
ki
βkixk + θi, i = 2, 3, 4. (2)
The x vector contains k observed family characteristics for variable i, such as
age of the youngest child, age and education level of the spouses, and area of res-
idence.9 It is, however, likely that many reasons for heterogeneity of preferences
are unobserved. The vector Θ = {θ2, θ3, θ4} therefore represents unobserved family
characteristics that affect household preferences for leisure and welfare participation.
We formulate a finite mixture model, which allows for unobserved heterogeneity in
a very flexible way, without imposing a parametric structure. We assume that there
exist N different sets of Θ = {θ2, θ3, θ4} that determine a household’s preferences,
each observed with probability pin (where pin > 0 and
∑
pin = 1, n = 1, ..., N).
10
This specification allows for arbitrary correlations between the husband’s and the
wife’s work effort as well as between each spouse’s work effort and preference for
welfare participation.
For any possible combination of labor supply, the household obtains a certain
disposable income level, y. It is composed of post-tax labor income, received benefits
and other non-labor income, minus child-care fees:
y =wmhm + wfhf − τm (wmhm)− τf (wfhf ) + µ (wmhm + wfhf ) (3)
− ϕ (min [hm, hf ] , (wmhm + wfhf )) + v,
where wm and wf denote the gross wage rates of the spouses, and hm and hf are hours
of market work during the year. Income taxes are determined by the tax function
τ , which is individual, while means-tested benefits are determined by household
income. µ consists of means-tested as well as of universal benefits, such as the child
benefit. If both spouses work, they use subsidized child care. The child-care fee,
ϕ, is determined by household labor income and time spent in child care (which we
measure as working hours for the spouse with the least labor supply). v is net-of-tax
non-labor, non-benefit income.
Each individual can choose between M labor supply alternatives, implying a
9Summary statistics of the xk’s are presented in Tables A.1 and A.2 and the estimates of the
βki ’s in A.3.
10In our data we identify four different types, implying that N = 4.
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total number ofM2 choice opportunities for a two-parent household. In the empirical
part, we assume thatM = 5, implying 25 possible work combinations for a couple.11
By including disutility from social assistance, a two-parent family may face up to
2M2 = 50 work and welfare possibilities. Solving the optimization problem therefore
requires evaluating the utility function in (1) for each possible work and welfare
combination and then choosing the one that yields the highest utility.
To make the model estimable, we add a random disturbance term to the utilities
of all possible choices
Uhmhfσ = U
(
Γhmhfσ
)
+ ηhmhfσ, (4)
where U
(
Γhmhfσ
)
is defined in Equation (1) for labor supply alternatives hm and
hf , (hi = 1, ...,M for i = m, f) and for welfare participation (σ = 1) or not
(σ = 0). ηhmhfσ is a random term, which can be interpreted as an unobserved
utility component associated with alternative hmhfσ. We assume that ηhmhfσ fol-
lows a type I extreme-value distribution with cumulative density P (ηhmhfσ < η) =
exp(− exp(−η))(η ∈ R).
Given the distributional assumptions of the stochastic terms in the utility func-
tion, the contribution to the likelihood function for a given household is
l =
N∑
n=1
pin
[ 1∑
σ=0
M∑
hf=1
M∑
hm=1
(p|Θn)hmhfσ
]
δhmhfσ, (5)
where the unobserved type Θn = {θ2n , θ3n , θ4n} occurs with probability pin and
δhmhfσ is an indicator for the observed state for the household, and where
(p|Θ)hmhfσ =
exp
(
U
(
Γhmhfσ|Θ
))∑1
σ′=0
∑M
h′f=1
∑M
h′m=1
exp
(
U
(
Γh′mh′fσ′|Θ
)) , ∀ hmhfσ 6= h′mh′fσ′ (6)
denotes the probability that the utility in state (hmhfσ) is the highest among all
obtainable combinations, conditional on unobserved preferences.
The estimated parameters for the structural models for two-parent and single-
mother households are presented in Tables A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix and dis-
cussed in Section 6.1.
11We set h1 = 0, h2 = 375, h3 = 1, 125, h4 = 1, 875 and h5 = 2, 650 hours per year.
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4 Data
The data used for this study comes from the Swedish Income Distribution Sur-
vey (HEK) and from the Swedish Longitudinal Individual Data (LINDA). We use
HEK to construct the data for two-parent households, and LINDA for single-mother
households.12
Our sample includes households with one to five children, where the youngest
child is 1–5 years old. We use data from the 1999 survey of HEK and the 1999
wave of LINDA. We sample families with children born 1994-1998 (sample A). In
a sensitivity analysis (se Section 7.1), we sample families with children born 1993-
1997 (sample B). We exclude families where at least one parent is either a full-time
student, retired or self-employed. After these selections Sample A includes 1,209
single-mother households and 733 two-parent households.
HEK is an annual survey conducted by Statistics Sweden. It contains information
on labor market activities, demographic characteristics and incomes for a random
sample of 20,000 Swedish households. The survey is a cross-sectional representation
of the Swedish population. LINDA is completely based on register-information,
and thus provides high-quality income data. It is a representative random sample
and consists of approximately 300,000 individuals (about 3 percent of the Swedish
population).
The reason for choosing 1999 as the year of study is that the maximum fee
was not yet implemented. We therefore use the behavior of parents in the old
child-care fee system to predict their responses to the maximum fee reform. The
reason for using different data sets for different types of households is that HEK
is a smaller data set and does therefore not include a sufficient number of single
mothers whose youngest child is 1–5 years old. In LINDA, on the other hand, there
is wage information for the sampled person only; hence we have no wage information
for spouses in that data set. Since LINDA is register based, we treat the mothers
who are not married and who are not cohabiting with the father of their children as
single mothers. We might therefore have women in our single-mother sample who
cohabit with somebody other than their children’s father. Consequently, the results
for this group may be understated.
Information on income is obtained from administrative records with precise in-
12Single-father households are excluded due to being extremely rare.
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formation on labor as well as on non-labor income. Non-labor income includes any
capital income, the national child benefit, and child-support payments.
The wage data was collected from The Official Statistics on Wages produced by
Statistics Sweden. It is based on reports from employers and includes individual
monthly salaries in full-time equivalents together with information on working time
and occupation. Although there may be some problems with individuals who have
more than one employer (only information from the main employer is included), this
data is superior to the usual self-reported wage data, where the recall errors may be
substantial.
We use the wage data to estimate the wage equations. To account for missing
wages among non-workers, we estimate selection-corrected wage equations by max-
imum likelihood.13 In order to be consistent regarding the stochastic specification,
the wage equation estimates are then used to predict wages for both workers and
non-workers.14
To generate disposable income for various combinations of hours of work, we use
precise information on income tax rules as well as on eligibility rules for a number of
welfare programs, such as social assistance and housing allowance. We use the FASIT
model from Statistics Sweden, which is a micro simulation model that includes all
rules for taxes, transfers and fees in all Swedish municipalities. Moreover, while
FASIT is originally linked to the HEK data set, we have made appropriate links
to LINDA as well. This enables us to calculate the child-care costs and disposable
incomes for all parents. However, we have no direct information about child-care
utilization. For single mothers we therefore assume that the number of working
hours coincide with the use of child care, and for couples that time in child care
is equal to the working hours of the parent who works the least. This should be
an appropriate approximation because children to working parents are entitled to
care during parents’ working hours only, and all Swedish municipalities are forced
by law to supply care for all children aged 1–5.15 In order to calculate the child-care
cost for a household, we apply household income (which we know) and time in care
13Wage equation estimates are available on request.
14Using predicted wages for both workers and non-workers implies that the budget set is not
perfectly observed. An alternative is to use observed wages for workers and predicted wages for
non-workers. However, this may produce biased estimates as it could introduce spurious differences
in wage distributions across the two groups.
15Kornstad and Thoresen (2006) who also assume a fixed link between hours worked and hours
in child care find that for 80 percent of the Norwegian households studied, the fixed link is satisfied.
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(which we approximate with working time) to each municipality’s fee structure.16
A household is defined as a social assistance recipient if it received assistance for
at least one month during the year.
Descriptive statistics for the two samples used are presented in Table A.1 and A.2
in the Appendix. Single mothers are more likely to be younger, to be immigrants,
to have low levels of education than married and cohabiting mothers. They are less
attached to the labor market with lower labor force participation and less working
hours. They also have lower wage rates and receive social assistance to a larger
extent than do married and cohabiting mothers.
5 The Approach
We estimate the two discrete labor supply models in Section 3, one for couples and
one for single mothers. The estimated parameters are used to predict pre-reform
labor supply and disposable income. Then we use the parameters for simulations
of the maximum fee reform by applying the maximum fee to all municipalities. We
apply the fee 3 percent of gross household income for the first child, 2 percent for the
second, and 1 percent for the third child for family incomes below SEK 38,000 (EUR
4,222) to all households. For incomes exceeding SEK 38,000, we apply the fees SEK
1,140 (EUR 127), 760, and 380 irrespective of hours worked. The simulations thus
provide post-reform labor supply and disposable income, which we compare to the
pre-reform ones.
The reform has financial consequences for the public sector. There is a direct cost
of decreased child-care fees, but there are also indirect effects caused by altered labor
supply and disposable income. These effects include tax revenues (labor income
taxes, payroll taxes, and VAT), child-care costs (when child-care utilization changes),
and expenses for housing allowance and social assistance. We take all these effects
into account by aggregating the simulation results to hold for the total populations
of two-parent and single-mother households with the youngest child being 1–5 years
old. This enables the calculation of the aggregate net cost of the maximum fee
reform to the Swedish public sector.
We compare the effects of the maximum fee reform with an alternative reform,
16In municipalities with time differentiated fees, there are typically only a few time alternatives,
so this approximation should not lead too far away from the true fees.
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a reform with an income effect only. Therefore, we next calculate the child-benefit
increase that gives the same budgetary implications as the maximum fee reform in-
cluding indirect effects on public sector finances. We simulate the effects of increased
child benefits, analogous to the simulations of the maximum fee reform.
Although both reforms make all households with preschoolers better off,17 they
affect household utility differently since they have different effects on labor supply
and disposable income. As a means of comparison, we use equivalent variation
(EV ), a monetary value of the total utility change from each reform, defined as
U (h0, y0 + EV ) + η0 = U (h1, y1) + η1, (7)
where h0, y0 represent pre-reform labor supply and disposable income, and h1, y1
represent the post-reform ditto. η0 and η1 represent the random term included in
equation (4) before and after the reform, respectively.18 EV thus contains stochastic
terms both through the η’s and through the unobserved heterogeneity components
of U . To calculate EV we therefore use a numerical algorithm to find how much
money the household should receive to have the same utility before the reform as
after the reform.19
We can then compare the EV from the two reforms to conclude which reform
yields the highest utility for a specific household. If one reform is preferred by some
households and the other reform is preferred by others, then the reform yielding
the highest aggregate EV (
∑
EV ) is dominant according to the Potential Pareto
criterion; if the dominant reform is implemented, then the households preferring
that reform could compensate the households preferring the other reform.
When we compare
∑
EV , we regard one additional krona in a poor household
as equivalent to one additional krona in a rich household, although this can be
questioned. A poor household has higher marginal utility of the extra income than
a rich household. Many authors have therefore argued that instead of comparing
aggregate monetary effects of reforms, the weighted sums should be compared, where
households are assigned distributional weights (see e.g. Christiansen and Jansen,
17At least weakly better off. Households who do not utilize child care neither before nor after
the maximum fee reform get no utility change from that reform.
18Note that the random term is specific to each hours class, irrespective of the reform imple-
mented.
19See e.g. Aaberge et al. (1995), Dagsvik and Karlstro¨m (2005) and Kornstad and Thoresen
(2006) for alternative ways of estimating welfare effects in stochastic models.
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1978; Dre`ze, 1998; Johansson-Stenman, 2005).
In the tradition of Christiansen and Jansen (1978) we attach to household j
the weight ωj = y
−ε
j , where ε reflects the inequality aversion in society and yj is
the equivalence adjusted disposable household income. Hence, the social value of
household j’s EV is
EV socialj = ωjEVj = y
−ε
j EVj, (8)
where a low-income household is given a stronger weight than a high-income house-
hold. How much stronger depends on the inequality aversion parameter ε. We make
welfare comparisons of the two reforms for different strengths of inequality aversion
and compare the sums of the weighted EV s for both reforms.
6 Results
6.1 Structural estimates
The estimated parameters of the structural models in Section 3 associated with
observable and unobservable characteristics are presented in Tables A.3 and A.4 in
the Appendix. The utility functions – evaluated at these estimates and at observed
hours of work and disposable income – fulfill the conditions for quasi-concavity for
virtually all households. The condition was rejected for only 1.5 percent of the two-
parent households and 3.6 percent of the single mothers, who were then eliminated
from the analysis.
Because of the non-linear nature of the model the estimates of the βki ’s in equa-
tion (2) are difficult to interpret directly, but they give a hint about the effects
of observable characteristics on preferences for leisure and for welfare participation.
For parents with preschoolers, leisure is more or less synonymous with parental child
care. Hence, we find that parents with the youngest children prefer a larger share
of parental care or, rather, maternal care. For mothers, both single and married,
very young children therefore increase the utility of leisure (A strong positive effect
on β3). Poorly educated women have a looser connection to the labor market in
general, which we also find for mothers with pre-schoolers. For men, on the other
hand, lower education implies less preference for leisure (those with a university de-
gree are the omitted category), which could reflect the finding that highly educated
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men spend more time caring for their children.20
We note that the cross-terms between consumption and leisure (α12 and α13) are
negative, implying that households regard leisure and consumption as substitutes.
In two-parent households, the leisure interaction term is negative; if one parent works
a lot, the marginal utility of the other’s leisure increases, which could indicate that
leisure time is primarily regarded as child care time.21
Looking at the coefficients for the preferences for receiving social assistance, β4,
we see that couples with a one year old child are more reluctant to receiving social
assistance than those with older pre-schoolers. This means that there are families
with very young children eligible for social assistance, who choose not to receive
it. For single mothers, we find the opposite when their youngest child is two years
old; they are less reluctant to receiving social assistance compared to others. The
disutility is higher among people born is Sweden than among immigrants, which is
also found by Flood et al. (2004).
The estimates of the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity components
are shown in Table A.4. In the data, we identify four types of households, who are
characterized by different preferences for leisure and social assistance. Almost all
coefficients are significantly different from zero, which implies that preferences for
leisure and social assistance to a large extent depend on these unobserved factors.
Hence, when we control for observable heterogeneity, we still find differences in labor
supply and welfare participation among households, due to unobserved heterogene-
ity. For couples, the correlation coefficient between the spouses’ unobserved prefer-
ence for leisure is 0.46, implying that hard working men and hard working women
tend to live together (type 3), and that there are couples where both spouses have a
lot of leisure (type 4). This should not be confused with the negative parameter α23,
which reflects the marginal cross-effect on leisure and not the matching of spouses.
In Table A.5 the predicted uncompensated wage elasticities are presented. We
find that labor supply is rather inelastic; for men the result is quite similar to findings
in other studies. For women, there is great variation in estimated elasticities in
the literature depending on model specification and data source (see e.g. Table 5
in Kornstad and Thoresen, 2007, and Appendix in Viitanen, 2005). Concerning
labor force participation by married and cohabiting mothers, we find elasticities
20See e.g. Duvander et al. (2005).
21A negative labor interaction term is also found by Aaberge et al. (1995).
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considerably lower than in most studies from other countries. The exception is
Wrohlich (2006), who finds the participation elasticity to be 0.15 in Germany. Also
when it comes to hours worked we find an elasticity somewhat lower than what has
been found in other countries for married mothers.
For single mothers, we find much larger elasticities than for married and cohab-
iting ones. Wage elasticities for single mothers are generally found to be higher
than for married mothers,22 but the existing literature shows large variation. Our
results are comparable to those by Andre´n (2003) and Flood et al. (2003), who study
Swedish single mothers.
The reason for the comparably small labor force participation elasticity is prob-
ably due to the high participation rate among Swedish mothers; in our sample 87
percent of married and 72 percent of single mothers are actually working.
Figure 1: Observed and predicted hours of work
Figure 1 shows that the estimated model fits the data well. It shows both
observed and estimated probabilities, where the latter are derived by calculating
the average of the probabilities calculated in Equation (6).
6.2 Results of the maximum fee reform
The effects of the maximum fee reform are shown in Tables 2 and 3, where both
single-mother and two-parent households are categorized according to household
22See e.g. Kimmel (1998).
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disposable income.
As indicated by the wage elasticities, the effect on labor supply is stronger for
single mothers than for couples. Single mothers in all income classes increase their
hours worked as a consequence of the maximum fee, although the average effects are
modest, only 1.4 percent. The effect is the strongest in the lower quartile, where
hours worked increase by 16.5 percent. This effect is partly due to increased labor
force participation and partly due to increased hours of work among mothers already
working. Among couples, the effect on labor supply is very small in all quartiles,
although both mothers and fathers, except those in the upper quartile, increase their
labor supply to some extent.23
Due to decreased child-care fees, all categories of families receive higher dis-
posable incomes. The low ceiling makes the fee reduction larger for high-income
families, who gain more from the reform than low-income families in most munici-
palities. This is also true for the gain in utility terms, which is measured in terms
of equivalent variation, EV .
Table 2: Simulation results for the maximum fee reform. Single-mother households
Lower Upper
Average quartile Median quartile
Labor force participation before reform (share) 0.722 0.370 0.549 0.938
Labor force participation after reform (share) 0.727 0.387 0.559 0.938
Hours worked before reform (per year) 935 224 498 1,628
Hours worked after reform (per year) 948 261 521 1,634
Disposable income before reform (SEK per year) 129,658 83,602 101,693 174,735
Disposable income after reform (SEK per year) 134,480 86,985 105,360 181,636
EV (SEK per year) 4,349 2,002 2,882 6,696
EV (% of pre-reform disposable income) 3.4 2.4 2.8 3.8
Note: Hours worked are unconditional on labor force participation.
The results of the calculations of the aggregate costs for the public sector, taking
also behavioral effects into account, are presented in the second column in Table 4.
When the maximum fee is introduced revenues decrease due to decreased child-care
23According to Lundin et al. (2007) 36 percent of the households (those with the highest incomes)
paid a constant maximum fee already before the reform. For them there is only an income effect
associated with the maximum fee.
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fees. At the same time, the costs to provide child care increases due to increased
labor supply.24 However, increased income also implies increased tax revenues, both
directly and indirectly through increased consumption. Furthermore, less people
need social assistance and housing allowances after the reform, leaving the public
sector with a net cost of the maximum fee reform of SEK 1.48 billion.
6.3 Results of the child benefit reform
When we decide by how much to increase the child benefit, we choose an increase
that has the same net aggregate cost as the fee cap (SEK 1,482 millions). If the child
benefit would increase by SEK 5,500 per year and child aged 1–5, then the net cost
would be SEK 1,489 million (see the last column in Table 4), which is approximately
the same. We simulate the responses to such a reform and present the results for
single mothers and for two-parent households in Table 5 and 6, respectively.
All quartiles of single mothers decrease their hours worked as a result of the
increased child benefit, indicating that the income effect is strong enough to affect
their behavior. Single mothers in the lower half of the income distribution also
decrease their labor force participation rate. The increase in child benefit is, however,
not large enough to affect labor supply among the two-parent households.
Single mothers in all quartiles are better off with the child benefit reform than
with the maximum fee reform, both in terms of disposable income and in terms
of equivalent variation. For most two-parent households the result is reversed; the
child benefit reform shows to be less favorable than the maximum fee reform. Only
those in the lower quartile are better off with increased child benefit.
7 Comparing the reforms
The motive for implementing the maximum fee reform was to increase labor supply
and to improve the economic well-being of families with children. We evaluate
economic well-being in terms of EV , which is the monetary value of the utility gain
from the reform, taking the effects on leisure, consumption, and random utility into
account. The aggregate utility gain for all Swedish households with children aged
24This cost is calculated as the average cost for a full-time child-care slot. The real post-reform
cost could be lower, due to more children in existing groups, or higher if new child-care centers
have to be set up.
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Table 3: Simulation results for the maximum fee reform. Two-parent households
Lower Upper
Average quartile Median quartile
Husband’s labor force participation before reform (share) 0.956 0.823 0.911 1.000
Husband’s labor force participation after reform (share) 0.958 0.834 0.917 1.000
Husband’s hours worked before reform (per year) 1,824 1,345 1,628 2,074
Husband’s hours worked after reform (per year) 1,824 1,349 1,630 2,074
Wife’s labor force participation before reform (share) 0.896 0.685 0.823 0.978
Wife’s labor force participation after reform (share) 0.900 0.702 0.831 0.978
Wife’s hours worked before reform (per year) 1,392 572 1,054 1,751
Wife’s hours worked after reform (per year) 1,399 590 1,066 1,751
Disposable income before reform (SEK per year) 370,746 231,753 277,273 556,286
Disposable income after reform (SEK per year) 380,835 235,571 285,260 568,335
EV (SEK per year) 10,013 3,180 7,792 12,048
EV (% of pre-reform disposable income) 2.7 1.4 2.8 2.2
Note: Hours worked are unconditional on labor force participation.
Table 4: Aggregate public sector revenues and expenditures before any reform and
after the maximum fee and increased child benefit reforms (million SEK)
Child
Before Maximum fee benefit
Revenues 64,733 63,248 64,780
Income tax 27,542 27,592 27,517
Payroll tax 23,078 23,139 23,055
VAT 10,001 10,289 10,180
Child-care fees 4,112 2,228 4,028
Expenditures 27,569 27,566 29,105
Housing allowance 672 662 681
Social assistance 553 530 495
Child-care costs 23,682 23,712 23,645
Child benefits 2,662 2,662 4,284
Revenues – expenditures 37,164 35,682 35,675
Aggregate net cost of reform 1,482 1,489
Aggregate EV 1,780 1,151
Note: The payroll tax is 33.06% of the gross wage rate;
for the VAT we applied the rate of 17.6% on 90 % of disposable income.
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Table 5: Simulation results for the child benefit reform. Single-mother households
Lower Upper
Average quartile Median quartile
Labor force participation before reform (share) 0.722 0.370 0.549 0.938
Labor force participation after reform (share) 0.715 0.346 0.535 0.938
Hours worked before reform (per year) 935 224 498 1,628
Hours worked after reform (per year) 913 212 484 1,598
Disposable income before reform (SEK per year) 129,658 83,602 101,693 174,735
Disposable income after reform (SEK per year) 135,618 87,202 106,029 183,025
EV (SEK per year) 6,665 4,103 4,787 9,410
EV (% of pre-reform disposable income) 5.1 4.9 4.7 5.4
Note: Hours worked are unconditional on labor force participation.
Table 6: Simulation results for the child benefit reform. Two-parent households
Lower Upper
Average quartile Median quartile
Husband’s labor force participation before reform (share) 0.956 0.823 0.911 1.000
Husband’s labor force participation after reform (share) 0.956 0.823 0.911 1.000
Husband’s hours worked before reform (per year) 1,824 1,345 1,628 2,074
Husband’s hours worked after reform (per year) 1,824 1,345 1,628 2,074
Wife’s labor force participation before reform (share) 0.896 0.685 0.823 0.978
Wife’s labor force participation after reform (share) 0.896 0.685 0.823 0.978
Wife’s hours worked before reform (per year) 1,392 572 1,054 1,751
Wife’s hours worked after reform (per year) 1,392 572 1,054 1,751
Disposable income before reform (SEK per year) 370,746 231,753 277,273 556,286
Disposable income after reform (SEK per year) 376,443 237,196 282,769 562,197
EV (SEK per year) 5,696 5,442 5,496 5,910
EV (% of pre-reform disposable income) 1.5 2.3 2.0 1.1
Note: Hours worked are unconditional on labor force participation.
1–5 is obtained from Table 4. ΣEV for the maximum fee is SEK 1.78 billion, while
ΣEV for increased child benefit is only SEK 1.15 billion. When making this rough
comparison without any distributional concern, the maximum fee is superior to the
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alternative reform according to the Potential Pareto criterion.
What about distributional effects? In terms of disposable income, two-parent
households gain more from the maximum fee reform than do single mothers, and
high-income households gain more than low-income ones. Hence, just like Korn-
stad and Thoresen (2006) we find weak negative redistributional effects from fee
reductions. Table 7 presents the Gini coefficients and the 90/10 measure for the
disposable income of households with 1–5 year old children before and after the two
reforms.25
Table 7: Distributional effects for households with children aged 1–5 years
Before reform Maximum fee reform Child benefit reform
Gini coefficient 0.29 0.29 0.28
P90/P10 3.26 3.32 3.22
We note that the maximum fee reform increases the P90/P10, implying that the
reform enlarges the gap between high- and low-income families with young children.
On the contrary, an increased child benefit improves income equality. Hence, the
preferred reform when using the Potential Pareto criterion becomes inferior if we
judge the reforms from an equity point of view. From a social perspective, increased
inequality in society is regarded as undesirable and should be taken into account
when analyzing social welfare. We therefore weight each household’s EV by a social
weight y−εj , where yj is the equivalence adjusted disposable household income and ε
is society’s inequality aversion. Hence,
∑
j
EV socialj =
∑
j
y−εj EVj. (9)
The larger the value of ε, the more concerned is society about inequality. If ε = 0,
then Equation (9) reduces to ΣEV , while ε =∞ corresponds to the Rawlsian notion
of equality, where only the utility change of the least well off household matters.
There have been attempts to estimate plausible values of ε. Recently, the median
value of ε was estimated to 2–3 by Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), based on
Swedish students’ stated preferences for equality in society. Lambert et al. (2003)
25All figures are equivalence scale corrected. The scale used is the square root of the number of
household members, used by e.g. LIS, but the results are robust to alternative equivalence scale,
such as the OECD scale.
20
estimated the inequality aversion for several countries and concluded that Sweden
has a rather strong inequality aversion compared to other countries, suggesting an
ε > 2.
We calculate
∑
j EV
social
j for the two reforms using different values of ε, including
the values 0, 1, and 2. The results for the preferred reform depending on the degree
of inequality aversion are reported in Table 8.
Table 8: The preferred reform for different values of ε
ε Preferred reform
0 Maximum fee reform
1 Maximum fee reform
1.23 Equivalent
2 Child benefit reform
The social value of the reforms depend on the degree of inequality aversion. For
low values of ε, the maximum fee is preferred, but for the not unreasonably high
value ε = 2, the increased child benefit is preferred. The threshold value of ε, where
the two reforms are equivalent from a social point of view, turns out to be 1.23.
Hence, for values of ε < 1.23 the maximum fee is preferred, while the child-benefit
reform is preferred for higher degrees of inequality aversion.
7.1 Sensitivity Analysis
The target households of our study are families with children aged 1–5. Our results
are based on household behavior in 1999, and the sample used in our estimations
includes families whose children are born 1994-1998 (sample A). Accordingly, some
of the children born in 1998 have not yet turned one by the beginning of 1999 and,
as a consequence, the children in sample A are a bit too young during the year of
study. This bias is further strengthened by that children born in late 1993 are still
five years old during most of 1999, but are not included in sample A. To test whether
our results are sensitive to this potential timing problem we reestimate our models
using another sample of households, with children born 1993-1997 (sample B). In
sample B the children are instead a bit too old. The true effects should therefore
be somewhere in between the effects estimated for the two samples. The estimation
results for sample B are presented in Appendix B.
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When using sample B, we get almost the same labor supply effects from the
maximum fee reform as with sample A. The child benefit increase that would be
budgetary equivalent is still SEK 5,500 per year and child. Consequently, the welfare
analysis does not change very much, but the threshold value of ε, where the two
reforms are equivalent according to social welfare has dropped marginally from 1.23
to 1.15.
In our analysis we have focused on a specific child-care fee reduction. To see if
our results are more general we have also regarded completely abolished child-care
fees (for sample A). The effects of such a reform on labor supply are stronger than,
but similar to, those of the maximum fee reform. The budgetary equivalent reform
to abolished fees is increased child benefits by SEK 12,500 per year and child. Also
here the effects are similar to the smaller increase.26 The threshold value of ε does
not change significantly when we make this exercise; it increases from 1.23 to 1.26.
We can thus conclude that if the aim is to increase social welfare of families with
pre-school children, the choice between lower child-care fees and higher child benefits
does not depend on whether the fee reduction is made by imposing the maximum
fee or by completely abolishing fees.
8 Conclusions
Swedish child care is heavily subsidized. The recent Swedish maximum fee reform
has entailed further subsidies and increased the economic well-being of most families
with young children. The maximum fee implies lower indirect costs of market work,
thereby encouraging labor supply. However, we find weaker labor supply effects
than reported in comparable studies for other countries. The main reason for this
is probably the Swedish pre-reform situation, characterized by high labor force par-
ticipation among mothers. Another possible explanation to the small labor-supply
effects is that the Swedish child-care market is not significantly burdened with ra-
tioning problems.27
So, the main explanation to the families’ improved economic situation is not to be
found in increased labor supply, but rather in the size of the subsidies. Themaximum
26The results are presented in Appendix B.
27The rationing explanation is in line with the findings of Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) that
labor supply of Norwegian married and cohabiting mothers is somewhat less elastic in a non-
rationing than in a rationed setting.
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fee entails a sizable net cost to the public sector, a cost that must be financed by
distortive taxes. This paper does not analyze this aspect. Our approach is instead
to compare the maximum fee reform to an alternative, budgetary equivalent, reform
of increased child benefit targeted to the same group of households.28 The two
reforms are compared in a welfare analysis, where welfare is calculated in terms of
equivalent variation. The comparison shows that the maximum fee is the superior
reform with regard to aggregate welfare. However, according to our simulations, two-
parent and high-income households have gained more from the increased subsidies
than single mothers and low-income households. This is not the case for the child
benefit reform, which distributes welfare more equally among families. We compare
the welfare effects for different values of inequality aversion and find that if the
inequality aversion parameter ε ≤ 1.23, then the maximum fee is preferable from
a social welfare point of view. With higher weight on the equity aspect, increased
child benefits would instead increase social welfare more.
The reform was implemented by a Social Democratic government. The question
is whether ε ≤ 1.23 is a realistic figure for a government concerned with distribu-
tional effects? As discussed in Section 7, empirical studies suggest an inequality
aversion greater than 2. This means that the implementation of the maximum
fee was indeed inconsistent with the concern for income redistribution among the
Swedish people and in the Social Democratic government. In other words, the gain
in terms of increased labor supply is smaller than the cost in terms of foregone
equity.29
It should be noted that this paper does not regard any long term consequences
of any of the simulated reforms. Apps and Rees (2004) find that female labor supply
and fertility rates are higher in the long run if subsidies take the form of subsidized
child care rather than child benefits. This would speak in favor of the maximum fee
in the long run. Our results are thus limited to short run effects on families with
pre-school children and suggest that, for plausible values of inequality aversion,
28Bergstrom and Blomquist (1996) discuss the choice between child-care subsidies and child
benefits when tax rates are endogenous and find that childless people prefer larger subsidies to
child care, because this promotes labor supply among parents, which in turn allows for tax cuts.
Although our results indicate that the maximum fee would not allow for tax cuts, but rather
increased taxes, one should bear in mind that the reform could affect other policies, as well, which
in turn could have effects on the whole economy and not only those in the target group.
29A policy inconsistency of the same kind is found by Christiansen (1979) when studying the
Norwegian child benefits.
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the child-benefit reform would have been preferable to the already implemented
maximum fee reform.
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A Appendix: Sample statistics
Table A.1: Sample averages for single-mother households
Variables Mean
On welfare 0.29
Age 32
(6)
Education (highest)
Primary school 0.33
High school 0.60
University 0.07
Born in Sweden 0.81
Resides in Stockholm 0.23
Youngest child 1 year old 0.11
Youngest child 2 years old 0.16
Number of children 1–5 years old 1.14
(0.35)
Participation rate 0.72
Hours worked per year 950
(804)
Gross wage per hour (SEK) 82
(13)
Number of observations 1,209
Standard deviations within parentheses
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Table A.2: Sample averages for two-parent households
Husband Wife
Variables Mean Mean
On welfare 0.06
Age 36 33
(6) (5)
Education (highest)
Primary school 0.13 0.10
High school 0.70 0.71
University 0.17 0.19
Born in Sweden 0.88 0.88
Reside in Stockholm 0.18
Youngest child 1 year old 0.28
Youngest child 2 years old 0.22
Number of children 1–5 years old 1.60
(0.52)
Participation rate 0.95 0.87
Hours worked per year 1,983 1,396
(605) (756)
Gross wage per hour (SEK) 126 101
(22) (13)
Number of observations 733
Standard errors within parentheses
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Table A.3: Estimates of the structural labor supply model
Two-parent households Single-mother households
Variables Husband Wife
Leisure β2 β3 β3
Child 1 year old 0.25 (0.65) 1.40*** (0.53) 6.08*** (0.71)
Child 2 years old -0.37 (0.63) 0.82 (0.54) 0.83** (0.38)
Reside in Stockholm -0.06 (0.59) -1.02* (0.57) -0.69** (0.32)
Born in Sweden -1.37** (0.69) -1.46*** (0.54) -2.04*** (0.45)
Primary school -1.61* (0.87) 4.69*** (0.83) 2.35*** (0.64)
High school -1.56*** (0.65) -0.27 (0.56) 0.81 (0.52)
Age -1.21*** (0.20) -0.50 (0.17) -0.20 (0.23)
Age2/100 1.62*** (0.28) 0.74*** (0.26) 0.31 (0.34)
Being on welfare, β4
Child 1 year old∗ -0.97*** (0.37) -0.58 (0.55)
Child 2 years old∗ -0.43 (0.45) 1.16** (0.51)
Reside in Stockholm∗ -0.39 (0.54) -1.07** (0.55)
Born in Sweden -3.00*** (0.60) -0.66 (0.58) -4.12*** (1.22)
Primary school 0.13 (0.81) 1.87** (0.95) 2.72*** (1.05)
High school 0.66 (0.74) 0.99 (0.85) -0.20 (0.73)
Age 0.10 (0.28) -0.20 (0.34) -2.03** (0.89)
Age2/100 -0.19 (0.38) 0.25 (0.51) 2.81** (1.29)
Utility function
parameters
β1
∗ 8.62*** (2.71) 15.19*** (3.52)
α11
∗ -1.49*** (0.50) -2.74*** (0.76)
α22
∗ -16.55*** (1.05)
α33
∗ -10.83*** (0.77) -3.47*** (0.74)
α12
∗ -1.82*** (0.53)
α13
∗ -0.94* (0.56) -1.18 (0.76)
α23
∗ -4.22*** (1.05)
Log likelihood -1,475 -2,082
Number of observations 733 1,209
Standard errors within parentheses. *,**, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
∗Only one estimate for the household.
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Table A.4: Estimates of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
Type (n) Type prob. for Husband’s Wife’s Social Type prob. for Leisure Social
two-parent leisure leisure assistance single assistance
households mothers
pin θ2 θ3 θ4 pin θ3 θ4
1 0.66 52.00*** 30.81*** 0.84 0.10 70.50*** 3.35
(1.86) (0.84) (1.28) (14.87) (2.98)
2 0.19 54.84*** 47.36*** -0.55 0.05 20.02*** -41.44***
(3.42) (1.10) (1.32) (5.10) (17.46)
3 0.08 -19.80*** 22.62*** 19.74*** 0.40 17.12*** -36.15**
(0.06) (1.65) (0.06) (4.61) (15.82)
4 0.07 84.40*** 46.21*** -2.44*** 0.45 14.49*** -28.97**
(1.37) (2.26) (1.34) (4.48) (13.35)
Standard errors in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10,5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Table A.5: Uncompensated wage elasticities
Two-parent households Single-mother households
Husband Wife
Labor force participation
Man’s wage increases 0 0
Woman’s wage increases 0 0.15 0.35
Hours worked conditional on participation
Man’s wage increases 0.06 0
Woman’s wage increases -0.06 0.18 0.51
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B Appendix: Sensitivity analysis
In this Appendix we first present the results of the sample including families with
children born 1993 – 1997 (Sample B). Then we conduct a sensitivity analysis on
sample A where child-care fees are abolished altogether and compare that reform to
increased child benefits of SEK 12,500.
Table B.1: Simulation results for the maximum fee reform. Single-mother house-
holds (Sample B)
Lower Upper
Average quartile Median quartile
Labor force participation before reform (share) 0.721 0.322 0.545 0.955
Labor force participation after reform 0.727 0.348 0.554 0.955
Working hours before reform (per year) 987 202 519 1,740
Working hours after reform (per year) 1,001 222 541 1,740
Disposable income before reform (SEK per year) 131,505 81,878 102,238 178,357
Disposable income after reform (SEK per year) 136,192 83,968 105,515 185,526
Equivalent variation (SEK per year) 4,256 1,384 2,611 6,898
Equivalent variation (% of pre-reform disposable income) 3.9 2.7 3.2 4.4
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Table B.2: Simulation results for the maximum fee reform. Two-parent households
(Sample B)
Lower Upper
Average quartile Median quartile
Husband’s labor force participation before reform (share) 0.950 0.809 0.904 1.000
Husband’s labor force participation after reform (share) 0.952 0.816 0.908 1.000
Husband’s working hours before reform (per year) 1,818 1,369 1,626 2,048
Husband’s working hours after reform (per year) 1,819 1,372 1,628 2,048
Wife’s labor force participation before reform (share) 0.902 0.724 0.835 0.980
Wife’s labor force participation after reform (share) 0.907 0.737 0.842 0.980
Wife’s working hours before reform (per year) 1,401 671 1,088 1,729
Wife’s working hours after reform (per year) 1,406 686 1,098 1,729
Disposable income before reform (SEK per year) 351,461 225,244 263,979 528,732
Disposable income after reform (SEK per year) 360,914 228,737 270,827 540,490
Equivalent variation (SEK per year) 9,650 3,961 7,247 11,757
Equivalent variation (% of pre-reform disposable income) 2.7 1.8 2.7 2.2
Table B.3: Simulation results for the child benefit reform increasing benefits by SEK
5,500. Single-mother households (Sample B)
Lower Upper
Average quartile Median quartile
Labor force participation before reform (share) 0.721 0.322 0.545 0.955
Labor force participation after reform (share) 0.718 0.300 0.539 0.955
Working hours before reform (per year) 987 202 519 1,740
Working hours after reform (per year) 965 202 507 1,740
Disposable income before reform (SEK per year) 131,505 81,878 102,238 178,357
Disposable income after reform (SEK per year) 137,667 85,946 106,981 186,705
Equivalent variation (SEK per year) 6,804 4,248 4,965 9,957
Equivalent variation (% of pre-reform disposable income) 5.2 5.2 4.9 5.6
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Table B.4: Simulation results for the child benefit reform increasing benefits by SEK
5,500. Two-parent households (Sample B)
Lower Upper
Average quartile Median quartile
Husband’s labor force participation before reform (share) 0.950 0.809 0.904 1.000
Husband’s labor force participation after reform (share) 0.950 0.809 0.904 1.000
Husband’s working hours after reform (per year) 1,818 1,369 1,626 2,048
Husband’s working hours before reform (per year) 1,818 1,369 1,626 2,048
Wife’s labor force participation before reform (share) 0.902 0.724 0.835 0.980
Wife’s labor force participation after reform (share) 0.902 0.724 0.835 0.980
Wife’s working hours before reform (per year) 1,401 671 1,088 1,729
Wife’s working hours after reform (per year) 1,401 671 1,088 1,729
Disposable income before reform (SEK per year) 351,461 225,244 263,979 528,732
Disposable income after reform (SEK per year) 357,357 230,965 269,688 534,879
Equivalent variation (SEK per year) 5,896 5,721 5,709 6,143
Equivalent variation (% of pre-reform disposable income) 1.7 2.5 2.2 1.2
Table B.5: Simulation results for abolished child-care fees. Single-mother households
Lower Upper
Average quartile Median quartile
Labor force participation before reform (share) 0.741 0.382 0.580 0.954
Labor force participation after reform (share) 0.748 0.404 0.592 0.954
Working hours before reform (per year) 964 238 536 1,655
Working hours after reform (per year) 982 275 561 1,666
Disposable income before reform (SEK per year) 130,251 83,861 102,249 175,320
Disposable income after reform (SEK per year) 137,727 88,409 107,916 185,732
Equivalent variation (SEK per year) 6,744 2,959 4,682 9,934
Equivalent variation (% of pre-reform disposable income) 5.2 3.5 4.6 5.7
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Table B.6: Simulation results for abolished child-care fees. Two-parent households
Lower Upper
Average quartile Median quartile
Husband’s labor force participation before reform (share) 0.956 0.826 0.913 1.000
Husband’s labor force participation after reform (share) 0.959 0.837 0.918 1.000
Husband’s working hours before reform (per year) 1,822 1,329 1,623 2,077
Husband’s working hours after reform (per year) 1,823 1,334 1,625 2,077
Wife’s labor force participation before reform (share) 0.903 0.708 0.837 0.978
Wife’s labor force participation after reform (share) 0.920 0.775 0.871 0.978
Wife’s working hours before reform (per year) 1,405 594 1,079 1,757
Wife’s working hours after reform (per year) 1,418 649 1,106 1,757
Disposable income before reform (SEK per year) 370,791 233,161 278,500 553,772
Disposable income after reform (SEK per year) 395,503 248,744 300,098 581,475
Equivalent variation (SEK per year) 24,299 13,929 20,774 27,703
Equivalent variation (% of pre-reform disposable income) 6.6 6.0 7.5 5.0
Table B.7: Simulation results for the child benefit reform increasing benefits by SEK
12,500. Single-mother households
Lower Upper
Average quartile Median quartile
Labor force participation before reform (share) 0.741 0.382 0.580 0.954
Labor force participation after reform (share) 0.728 0.333 0.554 0.954
Working hours before reform (per year) 964 238 536 1,655
Working hours after reform (per year) 954 217 508 1,587
Disposable income before reform (SEK per year) 130,251 83,861 102,249 175,320
Disposable income after reform (SEK per year) 141,589 92,009 111,755 189,552
Equivalent variation (SEK per year) 12,775 9,274 10,440 16,241
Equivalent variation (% of pre-reform disposable income) 9.8 11.1 10.2 9.3
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Table B.8: Simulation results for the child benefit reform increasing benefits by SEK
12,500. Two-parent households
Lower Upper
Average quartile Median quartile
Husband’s labor force participation before reform (share) 0.956 0.826 0.913 1.000
Husband’s labor force participation after reform (share) 0.956 0.826 0.913 1.000
Husband’s working hours before reform (per year) 1,822 1,329 1,623 2,077
Husband’s working hours after reform (per year) 1,822 1,329 1,623 2,077
Wife’s labor force participation before reform (share) 0.903 0.708 0.837 0.978
Wife’s labor force participation after reform (share) 0.903 0.708 0.837 0.978
Wife’s working hours before reform (per year) 1,405 594 1,079 1,757
Wife’s working hours after reform (per year) 1,405 594 1,079 1,757
Disposable income before reform (SEK per year) 370,791 233,161 278,500 553,772
Disposable income after reform (SEK per year) 385,336 247,537 292,879 568,232
Equivalent variation (SEK per year) 14,545 14,376 14,382 14,460
Equivalent variation (% of pre-reform disposable income) 3.9 6.2 5.2 2.6
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